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Abstract 
 
This study examines whether differences in public sector efficiency are associated 
with diverging effects of public investment on growth. At first stage, we estimate 
public investment multipliers for each country of the European Union (EU). Their 
size varies considerably across countries. Then we construct measures of public sector 
efficiency which are used in the econometric analysis to study the relationship 
between public investment and growth. The main result of the econometric analysis is 
that the efficiency of public sector indeed matters in raising the influence of public 
investment on growth. This result remains robust to several changes in the 
econometric specification and to various measures of government efficiency which 
used as explanatory variables in the econometric estimations. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of fiscal policy and its effects on growth is one of the most extensively 
discussed issues in the modern macroeconomics’ literature. The relevant theoretical 
literature predicts that fiscal policy can influence growth by supporting aggregate 
demand under a Keynesian manner, or can hamper growth through crowding out of 
the private sector, under neoclassical economic theory. Empirical studies find either 
that the public spending multiplier is greater than one or that it is well below unity. It 
seems that no consensus has yet emerged from empirically estimated models 
regarding the response of output to fiscal shocks, with the magnitude of the response 
depending on several country characteristics related to monetary policy, level of 
development and government debt.  
Spending on public investments is a key component of fiscal policy as a 
means to stimulate economic growth and boost private investments. Figure 1 briefly 
illustrates the percentage of GDP that each European Union (EU) country spends on 
public investment. The question that arises is whether and to what extent does this 
kind of fiscal policy achieve its primary target? And if so, is its effect uniform across 
countries? This paper tries to answer this question by putting emphasis on the role of 
public sector efficiency in shaping the relation between public investments and 
economic growth. 
At first stage we follow the approach of Balnchard and Perotti (2002) to set up 
a structural VAR econometric framework and estimate multipliers of public 
investment spending. Quarterly time series datasets are compiled for each EU country 
during the period 1995:Q1-2015:Q1. The obtained econometric results confirm that 
responses of output after a shock in government investment are not uniform across 
EU countries and vary significantly. The magnitude of the output response after a 
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shock in public investment is positive for most of the EU countries however it 
remains very low or is even negative for fewer ones.    
Then we follow the methodology of Afonso et al. (2005) to construct 
measures of public sector efficiency for EU-28 countries in the period 2004-2014. 
These measures compare the performance of public sector in several key areas such as 
administration, education, infrastructure and stabilization relative to the cost paid by 
the government, in the form of public expenditure, to achieve its policy objectives. 
We also construct a composite efficiency indicator comprising of individual 
efficiency measures and a technical efficiency indicator following the methodology of 
Battese and Coelli (1995).    
These measures of public sector efficiency are incorporated into an 
econometric model to study the relationship between public investment and growth. 
The main result that arises from the econometric analysis is that the efficiency of 
public sector indeed matters in raising the influence of public investment on growth. 
This result remains robust to several changes in the econometric specification and to 
various measures of government efficiency that are used as explanatory variables in 
the econometric estimations. The main policy lesson to be learned from this study is 
that governments should focus more on the proper allocation of their resources as a 
means to maximize the growth influence of public investment. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the findings of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 presents public investment multipliers for each EU country. 
Section 4 constructs measures of public sector efficiency. Section 5 examines the 
influence of public sector efficiency on the public investment-growth relation. Finally, 
section 6 concludes. 
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2. Related literature 
This study is related to a large literature which examines the effects of fiscal policy on 
growth. Predictions of the theoretical literature are ambiguous as regards the influence 
of public spending on growth. General equilibrium new Keynesian models show that 
the government spending multiplier can be close or above one (Gali et al. 2007; 
Monacelli and Perotti 2008). On the other hand, standard real business cycle models 
are in sharp contrast to new Keynesian ones and deliver multipliers which are well 
below one (Baxter and King 1993; Burnside et al. 2004; Ramey 2011). The main 
reason for such a significant difference is that real business cycle models feature 
infinitely lived Ricardian households, whose consumption depends on an 
intertermporal budget constraint. Therefore any increase in government spending 
lowers the present value of income after taxes, generates negative wealth effects and 
leads to a decrease in consumption. 
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Similarly, predictions of the empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policy 
on output are not uniform. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) show that shocks in 
government spending are associated with higher output of the US economy during the 
post war period, with the size of the multiplier being close to one. Monacelli et al. 
(2010) estimate a VAR model to evaluate the effects of U.S. government spending on 
                                                 
2
 Several studies have tried to reconcile predictions of neoclassical models with observed evidence 
which were in favor of a raise in consumption after an increase in government spending. Gali et al. 
(2007) extended a standard new Keynesian model to allow for the co-existence of infinite horizon 
Ricardian consumers and ‘rule of thumb’ consumers, which do not save and do not borrow. They 
showed that an interaction of rule of thumb consumers with sticky prices and deficit financing of 
government spending can account for higher consumption when spending increases. In a similar way, 
Hall (2009) developed a dynamic general equilibrium model which has as main features the decline in 
markups of prices over costs when output raises and the elastic response of employment when demand 
increases. With these features the model delivers quite high multipliers and increase in consumption. 
Recently, Cogan et al. (2010) showed that government spending multipliers are much smaller in new 
Keynesian models than old Keynesian ones, with the estimated stimulus in GDP being one sixth of 
what is predicted in old Keynesian ones.   
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output and employment. Their results are in favor of a multiplier which is larger than 
one.  
On the contrary, a part of the literature has identified non Keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy on output. Perotti (1999) evidenced several countries whose private 
consumption increased rather than contracted in periods of large fiscal consolidation 
and showed that in such periods the influence of fiscal policy is very different than in 
‘normal’ times. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) showed that fiscal stimulus based on tax 
cuts is more likely to increase growth as compared to fiscal expansion based on 
spending increases. They also showed that adjustments based on spending cuts rather 
than tax increases are less likely to create recessions. In the same spirit Mountford and 
Uhlig (2009) showed that deficit financed government spending has weaker effects on 
output of the US economy as compared to deficit financed tax cuts. 
It seems, however, that the effects of fiscal policy on private consumption and 
output have become weaker over time, with the influence being stronger in the pre 
1980 period (Perotti 2005; 2007). Also, the response of output depends on country 
specific characteristics related to monetary policy (Christiano et al. 2011), exchange 
rate regime or trade openness (Ilzetzki et al. 2013) and level of government debt 
(Chung and Leeper 2007; Favero and Giavazzi 2007). 
Building on the work of Afonso et al. (2005) who constructed public sector 
efficiency indicators, Angelopoulos et al. (2008) found evidence in favor of a non 
monotonic relation between government consumption and economic growth that 
depends critically on the level of public sector efficiency. Below a certain threshold 
level of public sector efficiency, the relation between public consumption and growth 
is negative whereas in most countries the influence of government consumption is 
negative. 
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3. Public investment multipliers 
A common approach to study the effects of fiscal policy on output is to use a standard 
VAR model. We start with estimating the following reduced form VAR:  
ttt UZLAZ  1)(   (1) 
where ),,,,,( ttttttt rpytgigcZ   is the vector of endogenous variables. This 
specification includes quarterly data on the logs of government consumption (gct), 
government investment (git), taxes net of government transfers (tt) and GDP (yt), with 
all four variables entering in real terms. It also includes a variable for the GDP 
deflator (pt), a variable for the 3-month money market rate (rt), as well as a 
deterministic constant term. All variables are seasonally adjusted except the GDP 
deflator and the interest rate. )(LA  is the autoregressive polynomial in the lag 
operator L and ),,,,( rt
p
t
y
t
t
t
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tt uuuuuuU    is the vector which contains the reduced 
form residuals. 
A major drawback of the standard VAR specification is that if covariance 
between error disturbances is not zero, which is often the case, then the common 
component of error innovations is falsely attributed to the first variable entering the 
VAR. As a way to avoid this kind of bias, after estimating the reduced form model of 
equation (1), we proceed with the estimation of a structural VAR specification to 
identify exogenous fiscal policy shocks. These shocks are then used to derive impulse 
responses of output. More details on the construction of the structural VAR model are 
found in the Appendix. 
For each EU-28 country we have compiled quarterly data from the National 
Accounts’ database of Eurostat (2014), except for Croatia for which the data 
availability is very limited. The sample of the analysis covers the period from the first 
quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 2015, however the length of the time span for 
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which data is available for all variables differs across countries. For each country, we 
have estimated a separate VAR system. The number of lags for each individual VAR 
was set so that no serial correlation existed in the residuals, the stability condition was 
satisfied and at least one of the information criteria was minimised. 
After the estimation of the structural VAR’s, a series of simulations was 
performed to trace the impact of shocks in public investment. The shocks were set 
equal to a positive one standard deviation and the impact of these shocks is illustrated 
with cumulative multipliers shown in Table 1 for various time horizons. We should 
note that the cumulative fiscal multiplier is defined as the ratio of the cumulative 
change in output, divided by the median interest rate, over the magnitude of the 
change in the public investment variable in period t=1:  
Public investment multiplier = 
YGG
iy
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*
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where y is output, G is public investment and G/Y is the average GDP share of public 
investment. 
For most of the EU countries, we observe that the sign of the multiplier of 
government investment is positive (Table 1), implying that an increase of government 
investment brings about a positive response of GDP. The highest response of output 
after a shock in public investments is observed in Germany, for which the multiplier 
reaches 2.08 four quarters after the initial shock. Highly positive multipliers are also 
observed for several other EU countries, suggesting that public investment spending is 
an effective tool for boosting the economy. Apart from short run influences on 
aggregate demand, supply side effects of public investment contribute to output 
growth, as a higher stock of public infrastructure results to higher marginal products 
of private inputs.   
8 
 
We also encounter a number of countries for which the sign of their multiplier 
is low or even negative. Overall, the size of the multiplier for public investment varies 
significantly across countries entailing significant differences on the way the 
economies are affected by a shock in public investment. The existing empirical 
literature has proposed a number of reasons for which the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy differentiates from country to country. In this paper we will try to examine 
whether the economic outcome of fiscal policy depends on public sector 
characteristics related to government efficiency. 
 
4. Public sector efficiency 
We follow the spirit of Afonso et al. (2005) to construct sub-indices of public sector 
efficiency in selected key policy areas. The areas that we focus here are those of 
administration, infrastructure, education and stabilization. In addition, a total index of 
government efficiency is constructed as the average of the individual sub-indices. 
Based on data availability, we construct annual indices of government efficiency for 
all EU-28 countries during 2004-2014. The main insight of this indicator is to 
compare the performance of public sector in these policy areas, in relation to the 
expenditure required to achieve this performance. Therefore, for each key policy area 
we utilize measure or measures of public sector performance relative to measures of 
public spending.  
In the policy area of administration, public sector performance is measured as 
the unweighted average of the variables of corruption perceptions index (available 
from Transparency International), protection of property rights (Economic Freedom 
of the World) and judicial independence (Economic Freedom of the World). The 
associated expenditure measure is that of the public consumption share in GDP, 
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available from Penn World Tables 8.0 Database (see Feenstra et al 2013). In the area 
of stabilization, public sector performance is measured as the average of the inverse of 
the variables of unemployment and inflation (both available from World Development 
Indicators), while the share of public consumption in GDP is used as an expenditure 
measure. In the area of education, the public sector performance measure that we use 
is that of the tertiary school enrollment rate while the associated expenditure measure 
is public spending on education as a percentage of GDP (both variables are available 
from the World Development Indicators).
3
 Finally, in the area of infrastructure, we 
utilize the variables of the volume of freight carried by air transport, fixed telephone 
subscriptions per 100 people, internet users per 100 people and mobile cellular 
subscriptions per 100 people (all variables are available from World Development 
Indicators) to construct the public sector performance index. The share of public 
investment in GDP (available from Eurostat) is used as a measure of expenditure in 
this area. 
 In order to make the measures of public sector performance and public sector 
expenditure (expressed in different units of measurement) comparable across 
countries, we express each country’s public sector performance and public sector 
expenditure measures relative to the average of all countries for each year. The 
resulting public sector efficiency index in each area emerges as the ratio of the 
relative public sector performance relative to the public sector expenditure measure. 
The total public sector performance index arises as the average of the sub-indices of 
public sector efficiency in the areas of administration, stabilization, education and 
infrastructure. 
                                                 
3
 For those years that we encountered missing values for public spending, we used the average value of 
this variable for the closest years.  
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 Table 2 reports selected public sector performance indicators for each of the 
four policy areas discussed previously as well as for the total public sector efficiency 
indicator. Countries are ordered according to the total index of public sector 
efficiency. As expected, high income EU countries get better than average scores. The 
most efficient public sectors in 2013 were those of Germany (2.26), Austria (1.92) 
and Ireland (1.76). In contrast, the least efficient ones in 2013 were those of Bulgaria 
(0.58), Slovakia (0.65) and Hungary (0.66). 
These measures should be used with caution. For instance, in some countries 
like Estonia, Croatia, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain the efficiency index in the area of 
stabilization receives negative values mainly as the result of negative inflation in 
2014. Also, in some countries for which the cost of providing public education is high 
(e.g. Sweden), or private resources complement government spending (e.g. Greece), 
we may be obtained with underestimated or overestimated, respectively, measures of 
government efficiency (see also Angelopoulos et al. 2008). 
 
5. Public investment, government efficiency and growth 
5.1 Econometric model, data and variables  
The obtained multipliers, shown in Table 1, suggest that responses of output after a 
shock in public investment are not uniform across countries. A meaningful 
explanation for such variation in the magnitude of fiscal multipliers is related to 
country specific effects including the efficiency of the public sector. 
 The general empirical model used to study the relation between public 
investment, government efficiency and growth is the following: 
ititititititit ueffpubaeffapubaagrowth  *3210   (3) 
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where growthit is the GDP growth rate of country i at time t, pubit is the public 
investment share in GDP and effit is a measure of public sector efficiency. We wish to 
examine whether efficiency of the public sector affects the impact of public 
investments on growth and, therefore, we include in our model the interaction term of 
public investments with government efficiency pubit*effit.  X is a set of other 
macroeconomic variables which are expected to influence economic growth and uit is 
the stochastic disturbance. We follow the literature and include in vector X the 
variables of private investment, public consumption and trade (exports plus imports), 
all of them denoted as shares of GDP. We further include the variables of tertiary 
school enrollment rate, the logarithm of lagged GDP and the lagged growth rates of 
GDP, to control for convergence effects and dynamic influences of past growth, 
respectively. Vector X also includes time and country specific effects, in the form of 
dummy variables, to account for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity and control 
for common macroeconomic shocks. Two additional dummy variables are included in 
vector X. The first one controls for any regional effects stemming from new EU 
membership (countries which entered the EU after 2004). The second one accounts 
for period specific influences to control for the recent financial and economic crisis.  
 We work with annual data for 28 EU countries which cover the period 2004-
2014. The growth rate of GDP variable is provided by the Penn World Table 8.0 
Database. Real GDP of countries is expressed at constant 2005 chained PPP dollars. 
PWT also provides us with the variables of public consumption and trade, while the 
variables of public investments and total investment were provided by the National 
Accounts of Eurostat.  Tertiary school enrollment rates were provided by the World 
Development Indicators. As for the efficiency variable we use several measures of 
public sector efficiency which were discussed and presented in previous section.    
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5.2 Basic results 
When estimating Equation (3), a possible source of bias could be the existence of 
unobserved country specific factors which affect growth and are contemporaneously 
related to policy decisions regarding public investments. In such a case the 
econometric estimates could be subject to an estimation bias. We have chosen to use 
the system GMM panel data estimator (see Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and 
Bond 1998) which is the augmented version of the first difference panel data 
estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991). This estimator eliminates such country specific 
effects and controls for the presence of endogeneity in covariates included in Equation 
(3). It has been designed for panel datasets with many panels and few periods as is the 
case for our model. Instead of the one step estimator, we chose the two step estimator, 
since it is asymptotically more efficient than the one step estimator and its standard 
covariance matrix is robust to panel specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
We preferred to use its robust version to get the corrected covariance matrix. 
 Column 1 reports the results when the identification strategy involves only the 
variables of public investment, private investment and the lagged growth rates of 
GDP. Instead of assuming strict exogeneity, we have allowed for endogeneity of the 
variable of public investment which entails the use of its lagged levels as instruments 
in the regression. As a rule of thumb for the choice of the number of lags, we chose to 
keep it at low levels, as a large number of instruments could lead to biased diagnostic 
tests. Therefore, the public investment variable was instrumented with its once lagged 
level. The results of the first column clearly suggest that private investment affects 
positively and significantly economic growth while estimates as regards public 
investment are not statistically significant.  
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Columns 2-7 present econometric estimates after including in the model 
several variables of public sector efficiency and their interactions with public 
investment. In particular, Column 2 reports results when the identification strategy 
includes as explanatory variable for government efficiency the simple average of the 
sub-indices of infrastructure and stabilization efficiency.  Similarly, Columns 3 and 4 
show us results of regressions when as explanatory variables are used the efficiency 
averages of infrastructure, stabilization and education and infrastructure, stabilization, 
education and administration, respectively. Columns 5-7 show us results when as 
variables for government efficiency are used the same indicators as those in Columns 
2-4 but with a greater weighting for the indicator of infrastructure efficiency. In such 
a way we put more emphasis on government efficiency in the area of public 
infrastructure, as it could be considered as a more relevant indicator to study the 
growth influence of public investments.  
We also construct multiplicative terms between public investment and various 
variables of government efficiency. Given that their correlation might be high, these 
variables are mean centered (new variables are generated by subtracting their means). 
In such a way, we are allowed to interpret the coefficient of public investment at the 
average level of public sector efficiency rather than at the point where efficiency is 
zero. The results of all columns in Table 3 show that the interaction term enters the 
estimated equation with a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This 
implies that in countries where public sector efficiency is high, the growth impact of 
public investment is superior. The coefficient estimates of the interaction variable 
range between 0.023 and 0.034, across various specifications. These point estimates 
will be used later to assess the growth contribution of public investments at various 
levels of government efficiency. 
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With few exceptions, the estimates of Table 3 confirm that the impact of both 
public and private investments on growth is positive and statistically significant. The 
variable of public sector efficiency although positive is not statistically significant in 
most of regression results reported in Table 3. We also observe that the influence of 
past growth rates is statistically significant.  
The system GMM panel data estimator reports several diagnostic tests. The 
first one is the Hansen test which tests for the validity of instrumental variables. The 
hypothesis being tested is that they are uncorrelated with the residuals and therefore 
are acceptable instruments. The GMM estimator also reports a test for autocorrelation, 
which is applied to the first differenced residuals. If the null of no autocorrelation is 
rejected, then the test indicates that lags of the used instruments are in fact 
endogenous and thus are considered as weak instruments. The results of both tests 
verify that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals and that no 
autocorrelation exists in the first differenced residuals.  
 
5.3 Robustness analysis 
We now examine the robustness of the obtained results by extending the empirical 
specification in two dimensions. First, we check whether results hold to a variety of 
econometric specifications. Then, we examine whether estimates remain unchanged 
when including in the baseline specification alternative measures of public sector 
efficiency. We first test whether the number of lags, chosen as instruments for the 
variable of public investment, affects the obtained econometric estimates. Therefore 
columns 1-6 of Table 4 repeat the econometric estimates of Table 3 (columns 2-7) 
when the econometric specification includes two lags as instruments for the variable 
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of public investment. We observe that econometric estimates of most of the variables 
included in the econometric specification remain practically unchanged.    
We also test whether the inclusion of other relevant macroeconomic variables 
affects the obtained results. The robustness analysis is conducted on model in Column 
5 of Table 3, which is our preferred model specification. In the first four columns of 
Table 5 we report results when including in the baseline specification the variables of 
public consumption (% of GDP), volume of trade (% of GDP), the lagged level of 
GDP and the variable of tertiary school enrolment rate. In the last two columns we 
report results after treating the variables of public sector efficiency and private 
investment as endogenously determined, as they might be affected by past outcomes 
of growth or may be correlated with the error term.  The econometric estimates of all 
columns shown in Table 5 confirm the initially obtained estimates as regards the sign 
and statistical significance of the interaction term between public investment and 
government efficiency.   
Next we examine whether results hold to a variety of sub-indicators of 
government efficiency. Table 6 presents estimates when using in the baseline 
econometric specification the indices of government efficiency in the areas of 
administration, stabilization, education and infrastructure. Although reported 
estimates on the variables of public investment and government efficiency are not 
statistically significant, their multiplicative term is positive and statistically significant 
for most of indicators used, except that of efficiency in the area of public 
administration.  
Finally, we follow stochastic frontier analysis as an alternative way to obtain 
measures of government efficiency. We base our analysis on the model specification 
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of Battese and Coelli (1995) in which a technical inefficiency model is simultaneously 
estimated with a stochastic frontier model at one stage.  
For each of the four public policy areas, we model for the existence of 
unobserved inefficiency within the following log linear stochastic frontier model:  
           0ln itY +β1 itXln + itit UV          (4) 
Yit is a measure of public sector performance in country i at time t in one of the four 
key policies areas discussed previously (administration, stabilization, education and 
infrastructure). Xit is the associated variable of government spending required as input 
in the public sector. Vit and Uit are the two components of the error structure. Vit is the 
noise residual assumed to be identically distributed and independent of Uit.  Uit is the 
nonnegative component of the error term, associated with technical inefficiency and 
following an asymmetric distribution of the upper half of the normal distribution.  
Along with the log linear stochastic frontier, we jointly estimate the following 
technical inefficiency model: 
                    μit = δ0 +δ1 Xit +Wit            (5) 
where μit is the mean of the truncated distribution of Uit which is associated with 
inefficiency. Xit includes dummies to control for unobserved country specific and time 
specific influences on inefficiency. Wit is a random variable, defined by the truncation 
of the normal distribution.  
All parameters included in the log linear specification of equation (4) along 
with the technical inefficiency model (5) are estimated simultaneously at one stage by 
using maximum likelihood. After estimating equations (4) and (5), a measure for 
public sector efficiency in each country i at time t is obtained by: 
itTE =  itUexp  (6) 
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which is a non negative variable between zero and one. The efficiency scores for each 
policy area are shown Table 7.  We also provide two measures for total public sector 
efficiency, the first one by attributing equal weights to each policy area and the 
second by giving a higher weighting to the efficiency index of public infrastructures. 
We observe that rankings of countries obtained after using these efficiency indicators 
do not differ substantially to those shown in Table 2. In Table 8 we report 
econometric results based on these efficiency indicators. The multiplicative term 
between public investment and government efficiency remains positive but is 
statistically significant only for the regression in which the equal weights’ efficiency 
indicator is used. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 The interpretation of the main coefficient of public investment (a1) is its effect 
on growth when the level of public efficiency is zero. This becomes evident when 
taking the partial derivative of equation (3) with respect to public investment:   
             it
it
it eff
pub
growth
*
)(
)(
31  


 (7) 
Similarly, when estimating a model with interaction terms, the resulting output of 
standard errors is misleading. We re-calculate standard errors of public investment 
conditional on various levels public sector efficiency (eff=xj) with the following 
formula: 
2
1
3113
2
1 ]),cov[2]var[](var[
31
aaxaxas jxeffeffaa j


 (8) 
The variances and co-variance in (8) are directly obtained from the variance-
covariance matrix in the original output. 
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We get a more realistic insight into the influence of public investments on 
growth by using equations (7-8) as well as regression results reported in Table 3 
(column 2). Figure 2 provides us with estimates of the growth contribution of public 
investment (vertical axis) at various levels of public sector efficiency (horizontal axis) 
along with its two standard error confidence intervals.  
We observe that for the whole spectrum of observations, the impact of public 
investments is statistically significant and its growth contribution ranges between 0.03 
and 0.16. As the level of public sector efficiency increases the growth impact of 
public investment also rises implying that government efficiency really matters when 
assessing the growth contribution of public investments. The main policy conclusion 
to be drawn from this study is that governments should place more emphasis on the 
effective and transparent allocation of their resources as away to increase their 
efficiency. This will bring about more rational choices regarding public investments 
and would in turn result to higher effects on aggregate economic growth.       
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether differences in public sector 
efficiency is an important element for assessing the influence of public investment on 
growth of EU countries. The associated fiscal multipliers differ substantially from 
country to country while the econometric results show that the efficiency of public 
sector indeed matters in raising the influence of public investment on growth. This 
result remains robust to several changes in the econometric specification and to 
various measures of government efficiency used as explanatory variables in the 
econometric estimations. 
19 
 
The impact of fiscal policy on growth is still an open issue. Further research 
may focus on whether country specific factors such as monetary policy, trade 
openness or the level of development affect the growth influence of either public 
spending or taxes. 
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Appendix 
Relying on Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005), the reduced form 
residuals for government consumption gc
tu , government investment 
gi
tu and taxes 
t
tu
can be expressed as a linear function of: (a) automatic responses to movements in the 
macroeconomic variables of GDP, prices and interest rate, (b) discretionary response 
of fiscal policy to macroeconomic news and (c) random exogenous fiscal policy 
shocks ( gc
te ,
gi
te ,
t
te ). The latter components are the structural shocks in government 
consumption, government investment and taxes that we try to indentify in order to 
measure responses of output. The reduced form residuals for government 
consumption gc
tu , public investment 
gi
tu , and net taxes 
t
tu can be represented as: 
gc
t
t
ttgc
r
trgc
p
tpgc
y
tygc
gc
t eeuauauau  ,,,,      (A1) 
gi
t
t
ttgi
r
trgi
p
tpgi
y
tygi
gi
t eeuauauau  ,,,,      (A2) 
t
t
gc
tgct
r
trt
p
tpt
y
tyt
t
t eeuauauau  ,,,,      (A3) 
In order to recover structural residuals from the reduced form VAR, we need 
to have estimates for the ai,j’s and βi,j’s.  The use of quarterly data allows us to set the 
contemporaneous response of discretionary fiscal policy to innovations in GDP, 
prices and interest rate equal to zero, since it takes more than a quarter to approve and 
implement new measures. Therefore, the ai,j’s coefficients in equations (A1), (A2) and 
(3) only reflect automatic responses of fiscal variables  to movements in variables of 
GDP, prices and interest rate. 
The output elasticities of government spending agc,y and government 
investment agi,y are set equal to zero, as there is no evidence in favor of any 
substantial response of these components to changes in GDP, within one quarter. 
Following Perotti (2005), the price elasticities of government consumption and public 
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investment, agc,p and agi,p, are set equal to 0.5, as several components of government 
spending are related to changes in prices (i.e. purchases of goods and services, 
wages). Also, given that the definitions of government spending and taxes do not 
contain interest rate payments, their interest rate elasticities are zero. The output 
elasticities of net taxes have been obtained from Veld et al. (2012).
4
 The price 
elasticity of taxes has been constructed as the weighted average of the individual 
elasticities of four broad tax categories: indirect taxes, social security contributions 
and direct personal and corporate taxes. However, we follow Perotti (2005) and set 
the price elasticities of indirect taxes and corporate taxes equal to zero. The price 
elasticities of personal income taxes and social security contributions have been 
obtained from Van den Noord (2000).
5
  
Once output and price elasticities have been obtained, the fiscal shocks can be 
expressed in the following way: 
gc
t
t
ttgc
r
trgc
p
tpgc
y
tygc
gc
t eeuauauau  ,,,,      (A4) 
gi
t
t
ttgi
r
trgi
p
tpgi
y
tygi
gi
t eeuauauau  ,,,,      (A5) 
t
t
gc
tgct
r
trt
p
tpt
y
tyt
t
t eeuauauau  ,,,,      (A6) 
Since there is no a priori knowledge on whether decisions for spending are 
before decisions for taxes or the opposite, we have assumed that spending decisions 
come first and taxes follow and therefore 0,,  tgitgc  .  
The reduced form residuals for GDP are a linear combination of fiscal variable 
shocks: 
y
t
t
tty
gi
tgiy
gc
tgcy
y
t euuuu  ,,,    (A7) 
                                                 
4
 In countries for which we do not have available the elasticities of taxes to GDP, we use the average of 
the Euro area countries. 
5
 In countries for which we do not have estimates for price elasticities of taxes, we use the average of 
the EU countries. 
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Accordingly, the reduced form residuals for price changes and interest rates are 
expressed as:   
p
t
y
typ
t
ttp
gi
tgip
gc
tgcp
p
t euuuuu  ,,,,      (A8) 
r
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t
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tgir
gc
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r
t euuuuuu  ,,,,,    (A9) 
 The final econometric specification can be written as: 
AUt=BVt  (A10) 
where ),,,,( rt
p
t
y
t
t
t
gi
t
gc
tt eeeeeeV    is the vector including orthogonal structural shocks, 
with:
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Tables and figures 
 
Figure 1 Public investment across EU countries (2014, % GDP) 
 
      Source: Eurostat, National Accounts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
4.00 
5.00 
6.00 
C
yp
ru
s 
Ir
el
an
d
 
Sp
ai
n
 
P
o
rt
u
ga
l 
G
er
m
an
y 
 
It
al
y 
B
el
gi
u
m
 
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
gd
o
m
 
A
u
st
ri
a 
Li
th
u
an
ia
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
C
ro
at
ia
 
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
 
Fr
an
ce
 
Sl
o
va
ki
a 
M
al
ta
 
G
re
ec
e 
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
Fi
n
la
n
d
 
R
o
m
an
ia
 
La
tv
ia
 
P
o
la
n
d
 
Sw
ed
en
 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
 
Es
to
n
ia
 
Sl
o
ve
n
ia
 
H
u
n
ga
ry
 
26 
 
Table 1 Public investment multipliers 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Lithuania -0.48 -0.90 -1.71 -2.72 
Latvia -0.15 -0.67 -1.20 -1.77 
Hungary -0.06 -0.32 -0.70 -1.14 
Ireland -0.06 -0.20 -0.71 -1.04 
Cyprus -0.13 -0.29 -0.42 -0.69 
Belgium -0.03 -0.32 -0.47 -0.67 
Spain -0.02 -0.11 -0.28 -0.52 
Romania -0.05 -0.11 -0.25 -0.42 
Finland -0.65 -1.06 -1.04 -0.36 
Poland -0.05 -0.08 -0.14 -0.32 
Portugal 0.10 0.02 -0.09 -0.26 
Bulgaria 0.030 -0.14 -0.21 -0.16 
Denmark -0.14 -0.10 0.02 0.21 
France -0.52 -0.57 -0.28 0.48 
Czech Republic 0.02 0.10 0.30 0.50 
Slovakia -0.07 -0.04 0.20 0.51 
Malta -0.01 0.19 0.39 0.63 
United Kingdom 0.07 0.17 0.36 0.63 
Sweden 0.19 0.20 0.54 0.76 
Greece 0.08 0.40 0.59 1.13 
Estonia 0.32 0.83 1.25 1.39 
Italy 0.08 0.26 0.68 1.39 
Austria -0.09 0.39 0.87 1.43 
Slovenia 0.25 0.69 1.18 1.57 
Netherlands 0.20 0.47 1.07 1.69 
Luxembourg 0.96 1.70 1.83 1.71 
Germany 0.17 0.73 1.42 2.08 
               *Countries are ordered in ascending order of the public investment multiplier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Table 2 Public sector efficiency indicators 
 
Administration 
index (2013)  
Stabilization 
index (2014) 
Education 
index (2013) 
Infrastructure 
index (2014) 
Total Index 
(2013) 
Bulgaria 0.41 0.29 0.73 0.46 0.58 
Slovakia 0.53 -0.87 0.69 0.58 0.65 
Hungary 0.62 0.19 0.65 0.48 0.66 
Croatia 0.63 -0.20 0.87 0.67 0.68 
Romania 0.62 0.34 0.56 0.44 0.72 
Lithuania 0.71 1.32 0.90 0.67 0.76 
Latvia 0.80 0.66 0.91 0.51 0.78 
Poland 0.86 1.58 1.03 0.51 0.86 
Estonia 0.96 -0.02 0.97 0.58 0.87 
Czech Republic 0.67 1.07 0.81 0.59 0.88 
Malta 0.82 1.06 0.54 0.81 0.96 
Sweden 1.16 0.07 0.86 0.70 0.98 
Cyprus 1.17 0.36 0.84 1.24 0.99 
Slovenia 0.86 1.27 1.37 0.50 1.00 
Portugal 1.06 -0.01 1.06 1.42 1.02 
Spain 0.92 -0.61 1.47 1.67 1.09 
Italy 0.91 1.13 1.15 1.49 1.13 
Greece 0.88 0.16 2.23 0.71 1.14 
Finland 1.37 0.69 1.30 0.69 1.15 
France 1.14 0.74 0.89 1.67 1.15 
Denmark 1.28 0.94 1.13 0.73 1.16 
Belgium 1.31 1.04 1.16 1.74 1.40 
Netherlands 1.19 0.84 1.05 2.02 1.41 
United Kingdom 1.48 1.12 0.99 2.75 1.70 
Luxembourg 1.85 1.55 0.43 2.04 1.73 
Ireland 2.25 1.81 1.80 1.52 1.76 
Austria 1.66 1.66 1.71 1.12 1.92 
Germany 1.58 1.49 1.12 3.95 2.26 
*Countries are ranked in ascending order of the total public sector efficiency index.**Scores for the 
administration index end in 2013, for the stabilization index in 2014, for the education index  in 2013, 
for the infrastructure index in 2014 and for the total index in 2013.   
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Table 3 System GMM Econometric Estimates (Basic results) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Public investment 
0.012 
 (1.29) 
 0.020** 
(1.97) 
0.020** 
 (2.05) 
0.020** 
 (2.38) 
0.019** 
 (2.53) 
0.014 
 (1.23) 
0.011 
 (0.88) 
Efficiency  
0.050 
 (1.41) 
0.077* 
 (1.85) 
0.078 
 (1.59) 
0.041 
 (1.45) 
0.051 
 (1.29) 
0.050 
 (1.41) 
Public investment* 
Efficiency 
 
0.024** 
 (2.51) 
0.023** 
 (2.36) 
0.024** 
 (2.18) 
0.034** 
 (2.02) 
 0.029** 
(2.04) 
0.034** 
 (1.98) 
Private investment 
0.008** 
 (3.07) 
0.004 
 (0.90) 
0.012** 
 (3.43) 
0.008* 
 (1.69) 
0.009* 
 (1.86) 
0.011** 
 (2.67) 
0.013** 
 (2.26) 
Growth rate of 
GDP (-1) 
-0.161 
 (-0.54) 
-0.441 
 (-0.97) 
-0.685** 
 (-1.99) 
-0.544 
 (-1.49) 
-0.349 
 (-0.75) 
 -0.474 
(-1.23) 
-0.139 
 (-0.95) 
Growth rate of 
GDP (-2) 
-0.485* 
 (-1.66) 
-0.361 
 (-1.04) 
 -0.837** 
(-3.50) 
 -0.541* 
(-1.71) 
-0.666 
 (-1.54) 
 -0.672* 
(-1.78) 
-0.802** 
 (-1.96) 
Constant 
-0.160** 
(-2.74) 
-0.195 
(-1.57) 
-0.375** 
(-3.69) 
-0.302** 
(-3.07) 
-0.246** 
(-2.09) 
-0.298** 
(-2.81) 
-0.310** 
(-2.61) 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-
value)
††
 
14.44 
(0.49) 
9.11 
(0.76) 
7.54 
(0.82) 
8.25 
(0.76) 
10.14 
(0.68) 
8.13 
(0.77) 
7.77 
(0.80) 
Autocor. Test (p-
value)
††† 
0.92 
(0.36) 
0.05 
(0.96) 
0.72 
(0.47) 
0.29 
(0.77) 
0.56 
(0.57) 
0.46 
(0.64) 
0.81 
(0.41) 
Observations 308 308 280 280 308 280 280 
† The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.   †† The null hypothesis is that the instruments used in 
the regression are valid. ††† The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-differenced regression 
exhibit no second order serial correlation.** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10 level. 
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Table 4 System GMM Econometric Estimates (robustness-number of lags) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public investment 
0.024** 
 (2.02) 
0.016* 
 (1.91) 
 0.018* 
(1.83) 
0.029* 
 (1.77) 
0.015 
 (1.63) 
0.017 
 (1.51) 
Efficiency 
0.056** 
 (2.91) 
0.066 
 (1.44) 
0.085 
 (1.47) 
0.045 
 (1.20) 
0.062 
 (1.38) 
0.067 
 (1.35) 
Public investment* 
Efficiency 
 0.020** 
(3.46) 
0.023** 
 (4.42) 
0.021** 
 (2.49) 
0.014** 
 (2.03) 
0.018** 
 (2.77) 
0.017* 
 (1.93) 
Private investment 
0.008** 
 (2.11) 
0.044 
 (0.88) 
 0.010* 
(1.94) 
0.005 
 (1.40) 
0.010** 
 (3.06) 
0.008** 
 (2.46) 
Growth rate of GDP (-1) 
-0.901** 
 (-3.65) 
-0.516 
 (-1.55) 
-0.693* 
 (-1.82) 
-0.744* 
 (-1.94) 
 -0.744** 
(-2.30) 
-0.683* 
 (-1.86) 
Growth rate of GDP (-2) 
-0.338 
 (-1.30) 
-0.444 
 (-1.31) 
-0.437 
 (-1.27) 
-0.281 
 (-1.09) 
-0.554** 
 (-2.24) 
-0.495* 
 (-1.73) 
Constant 
-0.306** 
(-4.06) 
-0.188 
(-1.63) 
-0.335** 
(-3.35) 
-0.254* 
(-1.75) 
-0.288** 
(-2.89) 
-0.270** 
(-2.48) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value)
††
 
6.21 
(1.00) 
8.79 
(0.99) 
11.90 
(0.96) 
11.04 
(0.98) 
9.99 
(0.98) 
11.70 
(0.96) 
Autocor. Test (p-value)
††† -2.01 
(0.04) 
0.22 
(0.82) 
-0.38 
(0.70) 
-1.02 
(0.31) 
-0.24 
(0.81) 
-0.09 
(0.92) 
Observations 308 280 280 308 280 280 
† The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.   †† The null hypothesis is that the instruments used in the 
regression are valid. ††† The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-differenced regression exhibit 
no second order serial correlation. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5 System GMM Econometric Estimates (Different econometric specifications) 
 Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
 
Public 
consumption 
Trade 
Initial 
GDP 
Tertiary 
school 
enrollment 
rate  
Endogenous 
efficiency 
Endogenous 
private 
investment 
Public investment 
0.012 
 (0.60) 
 0.021** 
(2.34) 
0.023** 
 (3.25) 
0.009 
(0.79) 
-0.017 
 (-0.72) 
-0.010 
 (-0.57) 
Efficiency 
0.058 
 (0.77) 
0.093** 
 (2.29) 
0.107** 
 (2.14) 
0.076 
(1.57) 
0.0009 
 (0.02) 
-0.002 
 (-0.05) 
Public 
investment*Efficiency 
0.025** 
(2.11) 
0.024** 
(3.92) 
0.027** 
(3.18) 
0.043** 
(4.57) 
0.039** 
(2.35) 
0.029** 
(2.49) 
Private investment 
0.009 
(1.51) 
0.010** 
(3.27) 
0.010** 
(3.14) 
0.008 
(1.41) 
0.004 
(1.05) 
0.005** 
(4.58) 
Growth rate of GDP (-
1) 
-0.268 
(-0.35) 
-0.575 
(-1.56) 
-0.625 
(-1.77) 
-0.072 
(-0.17) 
-0.479 
(-1.01) 
0.130 
(0.23) 
Growth rate of GDP (-
2) 
-0.483* 
(-1.67) 
-0.985** 
(-2.78) 
-0.958** 
(-3.71) 
-0.925** 
(-3.51) 
0.148 
(0.75) 
-0.013 
(-0.03) 
Public consumption 
0.400 
(0.49) 
     
Trade (% of GDP)  
0.0003 
(0.16) 
    
GDP (-1)    
0.0007 
(0.07) 
   
Tertiary school 
enrollment rate 
   
-0.0001 
(-0.11) 
  
Constant 
-0.337** 
(-2.59) 
-0.365** 
(-3.27) 
-0.394* 
(-1.92) 
-0.210* 
(-1.77) 
-0.017 
(-0.12) 
-0.037 
(-0.41) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value)
††
 
8.91 
(0.63) 
4.59 
(0.94) 
4.60 
(0.94) 
6.43 
(0.84) 
4.15 
(0.76) 
7.26 
(0.84) 
Autocor. Test (p-
value)
††† 
0.53 
(0.59) 
1.03 
(0.30) 
1.10 
(0.27) 
1.15 
(0.25) 
-1.30 
(0.19) 
-0.16 
(0.87) 
Observations 280 280 280 254 280 280 
† The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.   †† The null hypothesis is that the instruments used in the 
regression are valid. ††† The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-differenced regression exhibit 
no second order serial correlation. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant  at the 10% level. 
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Table 6 System GMM Econometric Estimates (Various efficiency sub-indices) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
 Administration 
index  
Stabilization 
index  
Education 
index  
Infrastructure 
index  
Public investment 
0.007 
(0.52) 
0.018** 
(2.01) 
0.009 
(1.29) 
0.011 
(0.90) 
Efficiency 
-0.0003 
(-0.07) 
0.026 
(0.86) 
-0.022 
(-0.35) 
0.015 
(0.85) 
Public 
investment*Efficiency 
0.004 
(0.29) 
0.027** 
(2.66) 
0.028** 
(1.97) 
0.013* 
(1.87) 
Private investment 
0.009* 
(1.78) 
0.004 
(0.96) 
0.013** 
(2.35) 
0.009** 
(2.32) 
Growth rate of GDP (-1) 
-0.075 
(-0.27) 
-0.206 
(-0.41) 
-0.280 
(-1.03) 
-0.543 
(-1.06) 
Growth rate of GDP (-2) 
-0.323 
(-1.08) 
-0.510 
(-1.16) 
-0.628 
(-1.40) 
-0.243 
(-0.83) 
Constant 
-0.162** 
(-2.34) 
-0.146* 
(-1.66) 
-0.208* 
(-1.94) 
-0.214** 
(-2.48) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value)
††
 
13.11 
(0.36) 
14.16 
(0.36) 
9.99 
(0.61) 
17.61 
(0.61) 
Autocor. Test (p-value)
††† 0.71 
(0.47) 
0.87 
(0.38) 
0.88 
(0.38) 
-0.44 
(0.66) 
Observations 280 308 280 252 
        † The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.   †† The null hypothesis is that the instruments  
        Used in the regression are valid. ††† The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-differenced    
         regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant   
        at the 10% level. 
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Table7 Alternative public sector efficiency indicators 
 
Administration 
index (2013) 
Stabilization 
index 
(2014) 
Education 
index 
(2013) 
Infrastructure 
index (2014) 
Total Index 
(equal 
weights, 
2013) 
Total Index 
(different 
weights, 
2013) 
Croatia 0.60 0.52 0.73 0.33 0.55 0.48 
Romania 0.60 0.92 0.58 0.19 0.57 0.44 
Slovakia 0.73 0.59 0.64 0.28 0.57 0.47 
Greece 0.62 0.36 0.99 0.40 0.60 0.53 
Cyprus 0.83 0.71 0.51 0.34 0.61 0.52 
Bulgaria 0.63 0.77 0.83 0.26 0.62 0.50 
Spain 0.79 0.25 0.99 0.50 0.64 0.59 
Italy 0.58 0.56 0.87 0.57 0.66 0.63 
Poland 0.80 0.67 0.92 0.27 0.67 0.54 
Malta 0.92 0.90 0.49 0.39 0.68 0.58 
Ireland 0.86 0.58 0.86 0.43 0.68 0.60 
Czech Republic 0.85 0.90 0.71 0.34 0.70 0.58 
Latvia 0.85 0.74 0.95 0.29 0.71 0.57 
Lithuania 0.86 0.75 0.95 0.29 0.71 0.57 
Hungary 0.91 0.88 0.78 0.33 0.72 0.59 
Portugal 0.89 0.69 0.87 0.43 0.72 0.62 
Luxembourg 0.90 0.89 0.20 0.99 0.75 0.83 
Slovenia 0.80 0.81 0.98 0.40 0.75 0.64 
Austria 0.87 0.83 0.89 0.52 0.78 0.70 
Estonia 0.95 0.86 0.99 0.43 0.81 0.68 
Belgium 0.93 0.79 0.99 0.53 0.82 0.72 
Finland 0.96 0.77 0.99 0.62 0.84 0.77 
Denmark 0.96 0.90 0.99 0.59 0.86 0.77 
France 0.93 0.72 0.86 0.99 0.88 0.92 
Germany 0.93 0.81 0.84 0.99 0.90 0.93 
United Kingdom 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.95 
Sweden 0.96 0.86 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.96 
Netherlands 0.95 0.91 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.96 
* Countries are ranked in ascending order of the total public sector efficiency index (equal weights). 
**Scores for the administration index end in 2013, for the stabilization index in 2014, for the education 
index in 2013, for the infrastructure index in 2014 and for the total indexes in 2013.   
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Table 8 System GMM Econometric Estimates  
(Alternative efficiency index) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP 
 
Total Index  
(equal weights) 
Total Index 
(different 
weights) 
Public investment 
0.007 
(0.97) 
0.003 
(0.23) 
Efficiency 
0.124 
(1.25) 
0.086 
(1.36) 
Public investment*Efficiency 
0.016** 
(2.17) 
0.019 
(1.36) 
Private investment 
0.001 
(0.30) 
0.005 
(1.36) 
Growth rate of GDP (-1) 
-0.106 
(-0.29) 
-0.150 
(-0.46) 
Growth rate of GDP (-2) 
-0.530 
(-1.22) 
-0.193 
(-0.41) 
Constant 
-0.125 
(-0.99) 
-0.151 
(-2.05) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time Effects
 
Yes Yes 
Hansen test (p-value)
††
 
8.21 
(0.77) 
9.43 
(0.66) 
Autocor. Test (p-value)
††† 0.95 
(0.34) 
0.23 
(0.82) 
Observations 280 280 
     † The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. †† The null hypothesis is that  
      the instruments used in the regression are valid. ††† The null hypothesis is that  
      the errors in the first-differenced regression exhibit no second order serial  
      correlation. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 2 Growth impact of public investment at various levels of government 
efficiency 
 
        Note: Squares are coefficients and triangles are two standard error confidence intervals. 
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